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Abstract: 
Neutrality as an attribute of the practice of mediation has been criticised in the mediation 
literature.  Key theorists maintain that mediator neutrality is a myth that hides the reality of 
the impact of the mediator on both the content and the process of mediation.  
Internationally, new models of mediation have been articulated that are therapeutic in 
nature, highly value relationships and include a multidiscipline approach to understanding 
conflict and emotion.  These new models reject the concept of the neutral mediator.  
However, courts and governments rely upon neutrality as a “legitimising  framework” for 
the wide adoption of mediation as an alternative to litigation.  In this paper we discuss the 
paradigm of therapeutic jurisprudence and its links with new models of mediation, such as 
the transformative and narrative models.  We postulate that the discourse of therapeutic 
jurisprudence can convince courts and governments to adopt models of mediation that 
eschew the attribute of neutrality. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The use of the alternative dispute resolution process (ADR) of mediation is common in 
courts and tribunals in Australia.   The third party facilitation of disputes is routinely used 
as an adjunct to litigation either prior to the instigation of proceedings or as part of the 
case management of actions.1  In fact, the largest growth in the use of mediation has not 
come from public demand, but from the institutional adoption by courts and tribunals of 
this process.2  In recent years government backed mediation schemes, or similar third 
party dispute resolution processes, has seen consistent and widespread growth.3  One of 
the tenets of mediation has traditionally been the notion of the neutral third party.   The 
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1 Moreton Rolfe J, “The Relationship between Case Management and Mediation,’”(2006) 26 The Arbitrator and Mediator 81. 
2 Mack K, Court Referral to ADR: Criteria and Research. National Alternative Dispute Resolution Advisory Council and Australian Institute of 
Judicial Administration, (Canberra 2003). 
 
3 For instance the overhaul of industrial relations includes the promotion of dispute resolution processes Part VIIA Workplace Relations Amendment 
(Work Choices) Act 2005 (Cth) and similarly the significant reform initiatives in Family Law further promote dispute resolution processes, see Family 
Law Amendment (Shared Responsibility Act) 2006 (Cth). 
  
  
neutrality of the mediator is part of the “legitimising framework” that places mediators 
alongside decision makers in courts and tribunals.  Theorists have critiqued the notion of 
the neutral mediator arguing that the mediator affects the story of the mediation in a 
number of ways, most notably through facilitating the settlement of the dispute by 
privileging issues that lead to the ‘solving of the problem’.  In this way mediators 
influence both the content and the process of the mediation and move the parties 
towards resolution.  However, in the course of pursuing the answer to the problem of the 
mediation mediators may silence some parties concerns, particularly in regard to 
relationship and emotional issues, and may be unreflective regarding their own 
assumptions in relation to the parties.4
 
Not all models of mediation rely upon the rhetoric of neutrality. Internationally, new 
models of mediation have been articulated that are therapeutic in nature, highly value 
relationships and include a multidiscipline approach to understanding conflict and 
emotion.  The most influential of these models are the narrative5 and transformative6 
models and support for these approaches is evident in the United States and New 
Zealand.  In Australia these two new models have not been widely practised7 and the 
dominant models of practice, the facilitative and evaluative approaches, particularly 
where practised in the court-connected context, tend to mimic court processes in their 
pursuit of settlement.  In particular, the evaluative model gives the role of the third party 
an advisory capacity reminiscent of the expertise and decision-making role of a judge, 
Magistrate or tribunal member.  Although, in this model the mediator does not give a 
binding decision to the parties, the mediator advises the parties of their likely success in 
court.  This introduces a powerful incentive for parties to settle and reflects a degree of 
mediator influence that has caused scholarly and industry comment.8
 
In this paper9 we argue that the discourse of therapeutic jurisprudence can provide an 
alternative “legitimising framework” for the practice of mediation.  The philosophy of 
therapeutic jurisprudence has grown in influence,10 particularly in the last decade, and 
articulates a concern that the law be assessed under a normative framework that values 
the therapeutic impact of the law and legal actors.11  Drawing upon the work of the 
social sciences this approach considers the law’s impact upon the emotional and 
psychological welfare of those who come in contact with our justice system.12  As 
                                                 
4 For instance mediators may harbor stereotypical assumptions regarding women and those from differing racial and ethnic groups, see for 
example Grillo T, “The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women” (1991) 100 Yale Law Journal 1545 and Gunning I, “Diversity in 
Mediation: Controlling Negative Cultural Myths” (1995) 1 Journal of Dispute Resolution 55. 
5 Winslade J and Monk G, Narrative Mediation. (Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, 2000). 
6 Bush RA and Folger JP, The Promise of Mediation: Responding to Conflict Through Empowerment and Recognition, (revised ed, Jossey-Bass, 
San Francisco, 2005). 
7  Boulle L, Mediation: Principle Process Practice, (2nd ed., Lexus Nexus, Sydney, 2005) 47.  
8 Feerick  F, Izumi C, Kovach K, Love L, Moberly R, Riskin L and Sherman E,“Symposium: Standards of Professional Conduct in Alternative 
Dispute Resolution,” (1995) 1 Journal of Dispute Resolution 95. 
9 In a previous paper we have argued more generally for the benefits of therapeutic jurisprudence in addressing the dilemma of neutrality in 
mediation practice see Douglas K and Field R, “Looking for Answers to the Mediation Neutrality Dilemma in Therapeutic Jurisprudence,”  Paper  
presented to the 8th National Mediation Conference, Hobart, May 2006. 
10 For a discussion of a range of initiatives in this area see Winick B and Wexler D, Judging in a Therapeutic Key: Therapeutic Jurisprudence and 
the Courts (Carolina Academic Press, Durham, 2003). 
11 Winick B, ‘The Jurisprudence of Therapeutic Jurisprudence’ (1997) 3 Psychology Public Policy and Law 184. 
12 Winick and Wexler, n 10 at 7. 
  
  
indicated many litigants are directed to mediation through the case management of 
courts and tribunals and though there have been seemingly high levels of satisfaction 
from participants,13 disquiet has been expressed regarding  the trend towards an 
evaluative model of mediation.14  In our view the evaluative model provides the 
opportunity for the mediator to hide behind the mantel of neutrality whilst in effect 
pursuing a determinative role.  We posit that this approach has anti-therapeutic 
outcomes for parties in that this model does not meet the emotional needs of participants 
and lacks procedural justice.  We argue that courts and government need to adopt the 
philosophy of therapeutic jurisprudence to stem the tide of the use of this model and we 
call for more research into the benefits of different models of mediation.   
 
To pursue our aim we will first discuss the dilemma of neutrality in mediation, we will then 
explore the discourse of therapeutic jurisprudence, we next canvass in detail models of 
mediation including the narrative and transformative models and lastly we consider the 
need for research that evaluates court-connected mediation models not merely around 
satisfaction rates, but whether there has been improvements to participants emotional 
and psychological well-being. 
 
The Neutrality Dilemma 
 
We have already asserted that, currently, neutrality remains an important concept in 
mediation, and particularly in problem-solving, court-ordered models of mediation.  
Certainly, most traditional definitions of mediation include a statement to the effect that 
“the mediator is a neutral intervener in the parties’ dispute”.15  There is clear ideology in 
the retention of neutrality rhetoric for mediation.16  Cobb, for example, has noted the 
connection with a moral commitment to concepts such as equality, participation, voice, 
and personal responsibility.17  Ideals of fairness, even-handedness and appropriate 
process are implied in the language of “neutrality”.  And although in reality it is an 
elusive concept;18 and, in mediation in particular, one that is manifestly under-defined,19 
                                                 
13 Research shows that mediation has largely high satisfaction rates amongst parties, however we need to query the expectations of participants of 
the process when assessing satisfaction rates, see Boulle, n 7 at 581. 
14 See for example Welsh N, “The Thinning Vision of Self-Determination in Court-Connected Mediation: The Inevitable Price of Institutionalization?” 
(2001) 6 Harvard Negotiation Law Review 1. 
15 Boulle, n 7 at 18.  See also Folberg J and A Taylor A, Mediation: A Comprehensive Guide to Resolving Conflict Without Litigation, (Jossey-Bass, 
San Francisco,1984) at 7-8; Moore CW, The Mediation Process, (Jossey-Bass, San Francisco 3rd ed., 2003). This is reflected, for example, in 
Laflin ME, “Preserving the Integrity of Mediation Through the Adoption of Ethical Rules for Lawyer-Mediators” (2000) 14(1) Notre Dame Journal of 
Law, Ethics and Public Policy 479, Kovach KK and Love LP, “Mapping Mediation: The Risks of Riskin’s Grid” (1998) 3 Harvard Negotiation Law 
Review 71.  However, of note is the fact that Sir Laurence Street’s three fundamental principles of mediation do not include a reference to neutrality 
on the part of the mediator: Street L, “The Language of Alternative Dispute Resolution” (1992) 3 Australian Dispute Resolution Journal 144 at 146.   
16   See for example  Coben JR, “Gollum, Meet Smeagol: A Schizophrenic Rumination on Mediator Values Beyond Self-Determination and 
Neutrality” 5 Cardozo Journal of Conflict Resolution 65. 
17 Cobb says that “moral values are so pervasive within our democratic culture that we do not notice them as moral commitments; we do not notice 
them as a frame containing moral discussions that is itself a moral framework.”: Cobb S,  “Dialogue and the Practice of Law and Spiritual Values: 
Creating Sacred Space: Toward a Second-Generation Dispute Resolution Practice” (2001) 28 Fordham Urban Law Journal 1017 at 1019. 
18 As MacKay comments:  ‘It is easy enough to say that the mediator should be a neutral facilitator, but what does that mean?’: McKay RB, “Ethical 
Considerations in Alternative Dispute Resolution” (1989) 45 Arbitration Journal 15 at 21.  Indeed it has even been said of mediators that they have a 
“very limited vocabulary to explain how neutrality functions.”:  Rifkin J , Millen J and Cobb S, “Toward a New Discourse for Mediation: A Critique of 
Neutrality” (1991) 9(2) Mediation Quarterly 151 at 152. 
19   For example, Laue has commented of the 1987 SPIDR ethical standards that “by my count, [the word neutrality] appears more than 35 times in 
the standards without any definition or description”:  Laue Jin Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution (SPIDR) (1987) “SPIDR’s Ethical 
  
  
it is little wonder that governments, who want to see themselves as providing good, 
moral and democratic dispute resolution processes, continue to see the notion of 
neutrality as central and key to informal appendages to litigation.  Nevertheless, 
relatively rigorous debate continues in the field of dispute resolution about the general 
meaning of the term.20    
 
Court-ordered mediation is predominantly focussed on problem-solving facilitative 
mediation models; but with an increasing emphasis on evaluative approaches by 
mediators.21  Problem-solving models of mediation are also more broadly dominant in 
Australia.22  Such models arguably allow for superficial assertions to be made of third 
party (mediator) neutrality, because the mediator’s focus is on reaching a solution; and 
because they emphasise, consistent with liberal legal ideology, the importance of the 
individual, and focus on finding an end result, or outcome, to the problem that brings the 
parties to the mediation table.  Such models tend also to assume that the parties are 
“autonomous, self-contained, atomistic individuals, each motivated by the pursuit of 
satisfaction of his or her own separate self interests.”23  Further, it is an assumption in 
relation to these models that the mediator’s expertise is focussed predominantly on 
process only, not on the content of the dispute, and that their facilitation role aims mainly 
to assist parties to their own mutually agreed outcome.24   
 
Clearly, neutrality becomes plausible if the rhetoric is that the mediator’s focus in 
problem-solving mediation is on process only, as opposed to the content or outcome of 
the dispute.  Equally, clearly, neutrality can also be argued as necessary in the context of 
problem-solving mediation in that it can be seen as playing an “important legitimising 
function”.25  The problem-solving nature of court-ordered mediation is comparable to 
the problem-solving nature of litigation; and notions of mediator neutrality arguably 
make problem-solving models of mediation credible,26 because there is an overt 
                                                                                                                                               
Standards for Professional Conduct” Forum, Newsletter of the National Institute for Dispute Resolution, March at 12. Taylor refers to the lack of a 
shared vocabulary in mediation practice: Taylor A, “Concepts of Neutrality in Family Mediation: Contexts, Ethics, Influence and Transformative 
Process” (1997) 14 Mediation Quarterly 215 at 217. 
20 Astor H, and Chinkin C, Dispute resolution in Australia. (2nd ed., Lexis Nexis, Sydney, 2002) at 77.  Gadlin H and Pino EW “Neutrality: A Guide 
for the Organisation Ombudsperson” (1997) 13 Negotiation Journal 17 at 17-18. Wolski, for example, also notes that focussing on theoretical 
differences in the approaches of various models of mediation to neutrality, whilst it is useful, “can disguise the extent to which all mediators 
influence the course and outcome of mediations”: Wolski B, “Mediator Settlement Strategies: Winning Friends and Influencing People”(2001) 12(4) 
Australasian Dispute Resolution Journal 248 at 249. 
21  For example, the influential body, the National Alternative Dispute Resolution Advisory Council (NADRAC), often assumes in its literature a 
problem-solving orientation:  National Alternative Dispute Resolution Advisory Council, The Development of Standards for ADR: Report (Canberra, 
2001). 
22 Boulle,  n 7, at 46 and  Della Noce DJ, Baruch Bush RA and Folger JP, “Clarifying the Theoretical Underpinnings of Mediation: Implications for 
Practice and Policy” (2002) 3 Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal 39 at 49: “The problem-solving model, while seldom going by that precise 
name, and seldom acknowledging or exposing its ideological roots, is the dominant model in the mediation field.”  We prefer the term settlement 
based mediation.  There are some positive attributes in relation to problem-solving, that arguably should be retained, but the focus of the mediation 
should not be upon settlement, a driving force to achieve a solution to the problem. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Boulle, n 7 at 18-19.  See also Astor, n 20 at 74 referring to Cobb S and Rifkin J, “Neutrality as a Discursive Practice:  The Construction and 
Transformation of Narratives in Community Mediation” (1991) 11 Studies in Law and Politics 69 and Harrington C and Engle Merry S, “Ideological 
Production:  The Making of Community Mediation” (1998) 22 Law and Society Review 709. 
26 Mayer B “The Dynamics of Power in Mediation and Negotiation” (1987) 16 Mediation Quarterly 75 at 83. 
  
  
connection with the language and ideology of judicial impartiality.27  This is an aspect of 
court-ordered mediation that possibly draws potential parties to the mediation process; 
that is, because of neutrality’s promise of fairness and its offer of protection against 
biased or unfair practice.  Such protections connect problem-solving mediation with the 
authority and legitimacy of formal legal adjudication processes.28   
 
There are, however, many issues arising from the neutrality claim in problem-solving 
mediation.  Some of these issues derive from the falsity of neutrality (discussed further 
below); but others arise as a result of the morally driven belief in the truth of neutrality, 
referred to above.  For example, the ostensibly neutral stance of the mediator in 
outcome and results-oriented problem-solving models is problematic from the 
perspective of achieving sustainable conflict resolution, because it can result in 
insufficient time or attention being devoted to emotional issues in disputes.29   Certainly, 
a neutral mediator who controls process only is unable to involve themself extensively in 
the detail of the parties’ emotions and relationships.  It follows that in problem-solving 
approaches to mediation, and particularly, for example, in court-connected mediation 
contexts, and in legal mediation contexts where the “shadow of the law” is very 
strong,30 relationship dimensions of conflict can be subordinated.   
 
There are a number of additional reasons why neutrality can be said to be a false or 
misleading concept in the context of problem-solving mediation.  For example, although 
the aspirational aims of neutrality are convincing, “pure neutrality is very difficult to 
achieve and sustain.”31  This is partly because mediation involves experiential 
imperatives, as mediators work “to assist clients who are struggling not only with 
interpersonal conflicts, but also intra-personal issues.”32  Sometimes, as a result, 
departure from conceptual notions of neutrality is required.33   It is almost inevitable, at 
least to some extent, that a mediator’s own emotional reaction to the parties and the 
dispute will influence their actions and decisions in mediation.  The mediator’s “own 
knowledge, experiences, and values” are also influential.34  Whether the mediator is 
aware of it or not, they cannot avoid a certain element of transference and counter-
transference between themselves and the parties.35
 
                                                 
27  Boulle, n 7 at 18-19. 
28  Ibid. 
29 Bush and Folger, n 6 at 239-247.  See also Alexander N, “Mediation on Trial: Ten Verdicts On Court-Related ADR” (2004) 22 Law in Context 8 
at 17; the exception may be in the Family Law jurisdiction. 
30  Mnookin R and Kornhauser L, “Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce” (1979) 88 Yale Law Journal 950. 
31   Bernard SE, Folger JP, Weingarten HR and Zumeta ZR “The Neutral Mediator: Value Dilemmas in Divorce Mediation” (1984) 4 Mediation 
Quarterly 61 at 72. 
32   Taylor, n 19 at 215. 
33   Taylor asks:  ‘The question for practitioners is whether articles like those of Rifkin, Millen and Cobb (1991), which propose a theoretical basis 
for understanding neutrality, are so conceptual as to be of limited value to the practitioner.’ Taylor, n 19 at 218.  As Astor has put it:  “Whilst 
practitioners make decisions every day about neutrality, it does not seem that those decisions are very much informed or assisted by the current 
research and theorising about neutrality.”: Astor H, “Rethinking Neutrality: A Theory to Inform Practice- Part 1,” (2000) 11 Australasian Dispute 
Resolution Journal 73 at 77. 
34 Cohen O, Dattner N, and Luxenburg A ‘The Limits of the Mediator’s Neutrality’ (1999) 16(4) Mediation Quarterly 341 at 342. 
35 Ibid. 
  
  
Neutrality can also be considered a flawed concept in mediation because the reality of 
mediation practice is that mediators are truly powerful.  Therefore, any “notion that 
mediators are passive participants in a process shaped by forces they have not 
deployed” is simply manifestly inaccurate.36  The work of Greatbatch and Dingwall, for 
example, has clearly shown that mediator values and judgments can, and often do, enter 
the mediation process and influence mediation outcomes.37  Particularly in relation to 
problem solving models, such as those used in court-ordered mediations, we know that 
some mediators will prioritise the reaching of a settlement, any settlement.  Settlement-
oriented mediators use what Greatbatch and Dingwall refer to as “selective facilitation” 
to push negotiations towards achieving an outcome.  In such circumstances, the mediator 
is clearly not neutral.  Rather they have an important impact on both the content and 
outcome of the mediation.  They cannot be said to be merely a process expert.38   
 
In support of these assertions, Astor and Chinkin warn that “it is not sufficient simply to 
claim mediator neutrality (as) mediators have considerable power in mediation and 
there is evidence that they do not always exercise it in a way which is entirely neutral as 
to content and outcome.”39  And according to Silbey “mediators exercise power by 
manipulating the immediate situation of mediation, and the interactions and 
communication between the parties, in order to control and shape the outcomes.”40  We 
also know, for example, that mediator power can be exercised in a gendered fashion.  
For example, the Report on the Evaluation of the Family Court of Australia Mediation 
Service acknowledged, significantly, that women were much “more likely to report that 
mediators pressured them into agreement or tried to impose their viewpoints on them.”41
 
Neutrality can also be considered “unreal” in the context of problem-solving mediation 
because it contradicts and interferes with what many mediators consider to be their 
ethical duty to ensure just outcomes.  It has been said, for example, that neutrality is a 
lesser value in the mediation process than the commitment to ensuring “fairness, or win-
win settlements.”42  This is the basis on which some mediators, consciously, non-neutrally 
and actively intervene for the benefit of a weaker party or absent third parties, such as 
                                                 
36 Silbey S, “Mediation Mythology” (1993) 9(4) Negotiation Journal 349 at 352. 
37  Dingwall R and Greatbatch D, “Who is in Charge?  Rhetoric and Evidence in the Study of Mediation” (1993) Journal of Social Welfare and 
Family Law 365, and Greatbatch D and Dingwall  R, “Selective Facilitation:  Some Observations on a Strategy Use by Divorce Mediators” (1989) 23 
Law and Society Review 613.  See also Mayer, n 26; Wade J, “Forms of Power in Family Mediation and Negotiation” (1994) 6 Australian Journal of 
Family Law 40.  Della Noce et al also note the reality that mediator practices can and do influence the parties’ conflict, (and raise) questions of what 
kinds of influence are appropriate and why, the nature of differences in mediators’ motives and orientations, and how different underlying ideologies 
shape mediators’ goals, and therefore, their influence on the conflict, in very different ways: see Della Noce et al, n 22 at 47. 
38 Boulle points to a growing realization amongst mediators of this issue and the concomitant realisation that neutrality is an aspiration rather than a 
reality, see Boulle, n 7 at 35. 
39   Astor and Chinkin n 20 at 102.  Professor Wade has said that “virtually every step taken by a mediator involves the exercise of power.”: Wade, 
n 37 at 54.  The research of Greatbatch and Dingwall asserts that mediators are clearly not neutral in their mediation practice; see n 37 at 74. 
40   Silbey, n 36. 
41   Bordow S and Gibson J Evaluation of the Family Court Mediation Service (Family Court of Australia Research and Evaluation Unit 1994) at 
112. 
42 Bernard et al, n 31. 
  
  
children.43  McCormick, for example, has asserted that “a mediator committed to 
representation of all the interests cannot be preoccupied with neutrality.”44
 
Theoretically, at least, a further complication arises in the distinction that is sometimes 
drawn between neutrality and impartiality.45  This distinction aims to address the 
neutrality dilemma in mediation by acknowledging that whilst a mediator may not 
always be neutral, they should always manage to be impartial.46  That is, certain 
mediator uses of power in mediation (for example interventions, actions or evaluations) 
can be seen as legitimate even though they might be said to strictly contradict the notion 
of neutrality.  Their legitimacy is based on the fact that such conduct still can be said to 
fall within the concept of impartiality.47  Such semantic distinctions, we think, are not 
necessarily meaningful or practically relevant for mediators or parties in terms of how 
they experience the reality of the mediation room. Many people, for example, consider 
neutrality and impartiality to be synonymous.  We don’t consider the distinction to be 
particularly useful, then, in any real sense; at least not without detailed explanation 
being provided to the parties. 
 
Our support of approaches to mediation that reject notions of neutrality is based on the 
issues with neutrality in problem-solving mediation articulated here.  We support 
concepts of mediation that move beyond the current preoccupation with false assertions 
of neutrality, and that move towards a principle of providing parties with a clear and 
accurate sense of what the mediation process can and cannot provide for them.48  As 
neutrality cannot realistically be achieved we argue that the better approach is to move 
to models of mediation that can be supported in other ways.  We believe that the 
theory of therapeutic jurisprudence offers a potential way forward for removing the 
perceived need for neutrality to be a “legitimizing” concept for mediation.  We next 
outline this theory and then relate it to the practice of new models of mediation. 
 
 
 
 
Therapeutic Jurisprudence 
 
                                                 
43   Astor considers that this has “the regrettable consequence that what many mediators would regard as ethical behaviour involves loss of 
neutrality”: see Astor H, “Rethinking Neutrality: A Theory to Inform Practice – Part II” (2000) Australasian Dispute Resolution Journal 145 at 147. 
44   McCormick M, “Confronting Social Injustice as a Mediator” (1997) 15 Mediation Quarterly 293 at 295. 
45 “In the case of mediation, each concept (of neutrality and impartiality) has a different significance.  Impartiality must be regarded as a core 
requirement in mediation, in the sense that its absence would fundamentally undermine the nature of the process.  It is inconceivable that the 
parties could waive the requirement that the mediator act fairly.  Neutrality, however, is a less absolute requirement and could be waived without 
prejudicing the integrity of the mediation process, for example in relation to a mediator’s prior contact with one of the parties or his or her previous 
knowledge about the dispute.” Boulle, n 7, at 20. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Boulle asserts that impartiality can be used to refer to “an even-handedness, objectivity and fairness towards the parties during the mediation 
process.”: ibid at 19.   
48  Ibid. 
  
  
Therapeutic jurisprudence49 is a recent philosophy50 that promotes a different approach 
to courts, tribunals and associated services in our legal and justice system.  Stemming 
from the work of United States academics, Winick and Wexler, in the mental health field 
therapeutic jurisprudence is an attempt to chart the impact on the emotional life and 
psychological well-being of those affected by decisions of our justice system.51   The aim 
is to draw upon the work of the social sciences in charting the therapeutic or anti-
therapeutic effect of decisions by courts and more widely, justice agencies.  This 
philosophy has been linked with other initiatives in the law, such as movements in 
preventative and collaborative law52 and has been identified as an influential vector of 
the comprehensive law movement.53  All of these approaches to the law attempt to move 
away from our adversarial system and look to innovative ways to solve the problems54 
that present to our legal and justice system.  The success of therapeutic jurisprudence is in 
its promotion of diverse initiatives, such as problem-solving courts55 and correctional 
programs.56 It is also advocated as a paradigm to temper the litigious culture of 
lawyers57 and promote practice that assists in the furtherance of a client’s overall well 
being.58    
 
It is an interdisciplinary approach59, and acknowledges the various disciplines involved 
in justice including, social workers and psychologists.  Although in Australia this approach 
has been mainly taken up in the criminal justice system60 therapeutic jurisprudence has 
                                                 
49 The website for therapeutic jurisprudence can be found at  (accessed at 24th April 2006). http://www.therapeuticjurisprudence.org
50 Therapeutic jurisprudence has been categorized as a collection of practices rather than a philosophy, see Frieberg A, “Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence in Australia: Paradigm Shift or Pragmatic Incrementalism?” (2003) 20 Law in Context 6 at 9. 
51 Winick and Wexler, n 10 at 7. 
52 Collaborative law has been canvassed in Australia see Scott, M “Collaborative Law: A New Role for Lawyers” (2004) 15 Australasian Dispute 
Resolution Journal 207; has recently begun to be trialled in Canberra, see Liverani M, “Canberra Law Firms Set the Pace on Collaborative Law” 
(2005) Law Society Journal 20 and is being promoted in Victoria, see Gale C, “Working Together” (2006) 80 Law Institute Journal 4. 
53 Daicoff, S “Law as a Healing Profession: The “Comprehensive Law Movement” (2006) 6 Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal 1. 
54 For example many initiatives in Victoria rely upon the therapeutic jurisprudence philosophy and are aimed at dealing with systemic problems 
such as the over-representation of people from marginalized and disadvantaged backgrounds in the justice system, see Department of Justice, 
Policy Framework to Consolidate and Extend Problem-Solving Courts and Approaches (Courts and Programs Development Unit, March 2006). 
55 See for a discussion of a range of initiatives Winick and Wexler  n 10 at 25. 
56 See for example Birgden A, “Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Sex Offenders: A Psycho-Legal Approach to Protection,” (2004) 16 Sexual Abuse: 
A Journal of Research and Treatment, 351; Birgden A, “Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Responsivity: Finding the Will and the Way in Offender 
Rehabilitation” (2004) 10 Psychology, Crime & Law 283. 
57 Popovic J, “Judicial Officers: Complementing Conventional Law and Changing the Culture of the Judiciary” (2003) 20 Law in Context 121. 
58 King M, “Exploring the Scope of Therapeutic Jurisprudence” (2006) 80 Law Institute Journal 48. 
59 The philosophy is supportive of interdiscipline practice between various professions such as the law and social work Hartley C and Petrucci C, 
“Justice, Ethics and Interrdisciplinary Teaching and Practice: Practicing Culturally Competent Therapeutic Jurisprudence: A Collaboration Between 
Social Work and the Law” (2004) 14 Washington University Journal of Law and Policy 133.  This is an appealing aspect to the philosophy as 
mediation also draws upon a wide range of professional backgrounds such as social work, psychology as well as law. 
60 Western Australian has a number of initiatives including the adoption of a resolution by Western Australian Magistrates supporting this approach 
see King M, “Country Magistrates’ Resolution on Therapeutic Jurisprudence” (2005) 32 Brief 23; King M, “Applying therapeutic Jurisprudence in 
Regional Areas-The Western Australian Experience”  (2003) 10(2) E Law- Murdoch University Electronic Journal of Law, 
 (accessed at 27th July 2005).  Victoria has introduced court services and programs  
attached to Magistrates Courts that could be categorized under the therapeutic jurisprudence philosophy see Popovic J, “At Your Service; A Guide 
to the Magistrates’ Court Services and Programs” (2003) 77 Law Institute Journal 32.  Various states have drug, family violence and Indigenous 
Justice courts that arguably can be seen as therapeutic jurisprudence initiatives see Frieberg A “Sentencing”  in Chappell D and Wilson P, Issues in 
Australian Crime and Criminal Justice (Sydney: Lexis Nexis, 2005). 
http://www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/issues/v10n2/king102.html
  
  
also been used as a theoretical framework in a variety of areas61 including civil law,62 
medical issues such as anorexia63 and neighborhood disputes.64  The mediation 
movement’s focus upon alternatives to litigation, which reduce stress and cost, has 
resonance with the aims of therapeutic jurisprudence;65  “It also studies the effects of 
conciliation and mediation processes as means of reaching settlement and avoiding the 
anti-therapeutic effects of protracted litigation and adversarial trials.”66  Some writers 
limit the kind of models of mediation that can be categorized as therapeutic to the 
transformative and narrative models.67  
 
Therapeutic jurisprudence has been accused of being paternalistic68 and might be said 
to extend the social control of the state due to the more active role of the court in 
supervising the lives of those who come before it.69  However, in the context of 
mediation, we see value in this philosophy in promoting models of practice that eschew 
neutrality, deal with emotion and provide a greater degree of procedural justice.   
There are clear links between therapeutic jurisprudence and new models of mediation.70   
Mediation is known for its therapeutic effect when incorporating storytelling,71 an 
attribute of both narrative and transformative models.  
 
Models of Mediation  
 
Unlike litigation there are many definitions of alternative dispute resolution processes 
(ADR) including mediation.72  Definitions range from the simple to the extensive and in 
an effort to provide a benchmark for practice the National Alternative Dispute 
Resolution Council (NADRAC), has provided two descriptions of mediation,73 but 
                                                 
61 McMahon M and Wexler D, “Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Developments and Applications in Australia and New Zealand” (2003) 20 Law in 
Context 1. 
62 See for example an analysis of recent USA civil case law and the therapeutic framework Wexler D, “Lowering the Volume through Legal 
Doctrine: A Promising path for Therapeutic Jurisprudence Scholarship” (2002) 3 Florida Coastal Law Journal 123 
63 Carney T and Saunders D, “Therapeutic Jurispurdence and Anorexia: A Synergy?” (2003) 20 Law in Context 54. 
64 McMahon M and Willis J, “Neighbours and Stalking Intervention Orders: Old Conflcits and New Remedies” (2003) 20 Law in Context 95. 
65 See for example Schneider A, “Therapeutic Jurisprudence/Preventative Law and Alternative Dispute Resolution” (1999) 5  Psychology, Public 
Policy and Law 1084 and Schepard A, and Bozzomo J, “Efficiency, Therapeutic Justice, Mediation, and Evaluation: Reflections On A Survey of 
Unified Family Courts” (2003) 37 Family Law Qaurterly 333. 
66 King, n 58 at 50. 
67 Paquin G and Harvey L, “Therapeutic Jurisprudence, Transformative Mediation and Narrative Mediation: A Natural Connection” (2002) 3 Florida 
Coastal Law Journal 167. 
68 Arrigo B, “The Ethics of Therapeutic Jurispurdence: A Critical and Theoretical Enquiry of Law, Psychology and Crime” (2004) 11 Psychiatry, 
Psychology and Law 23. 
69 Hoffman, M “Therapeutic Jurisprudence, Neo-Rehabilitationism, and Judicial Collectivism: The Least Dangerous Branch Becomes Most 
Dangerous” (2002) 29 Fordham Urban Law Journal, 263. 
70 Paquin and Harvey, n 67. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Tillett G, “Terminology in Dispute Resolution: A Review of Issues and Literature” (2004) 15 Australasian Dispute Resolution Journal 178. 
73 “Mediation is a process in which the parties to a dispute, with the assistance of a dispute resolution practitioner (the mediator), identify the 
disputed issues, develop options, consider alternatives and endeavour to reach an agreement.  The mediator has no advisory or determinative role 
in regard to the content of the dispute or outcome of its resolution, but may advise on or determine the process of mediation whereby resolution is 
attempted.  Mediation may be undertaken voluntarily, under a court order, or subject to an existing contractual agreement. 
An alternative is ‘a process in which the parties to a dispute, with the assistance of a dispute resolution practitioner (the mediator) negotiate in an 
endeavour to resolve their dispute’” see National Alternative Dispute Resolution Advisory Council, Dispute Resolution Terms, (Canberra 2003) at 9. 
  
  
acknowledges that different agencies will have differing definitions according to their 
needs.74  Notably in their descriptions of mediation NADRAC does not include the 
attribute of neutrality however many courts and tribunals still do.  For instance, the 
Federal Court of Australia describes the mediator in the court-connected process as 
neutral and in addition advises that the mediator may suggest possible solutions.75
 
Boulle, when commenting upon the difficulties of establishing a definition of mediation 
points to the use of models as a way of showing the range of practice of this approach 
to dispute resolution. There are a number of models76 identified by Boulle, including the 
facilitative model which he states is the model extensively used in “training, writing and 
practice in community, neighborhood and family disputes” and the evaluative model 
which he states is much in evidence in “court-connected, commercial and industry-based 
mediation”.77
 
As indicated earlier in this paper these two models are examples of problem-solving 
models where settlement of a dispute is the main aim of the process.78 However, these 
dominant approaches do not provide the range of dispute resolution methods to deal 
with the differing kinds and contexts of conflict in our society.79 An alternative approach 
to problem-solving models is the narrative and transformative models where the aim is 
not to focus upon solutions, but to prioritize exploring emotion and relationship issues 
between the disputants, although solutions to the problems brought to the mediation 
table are often found. 80
 
In this discussion we first wish to highlight the differences between the two problem-
solving models of mediation and in the process of this discussion argue that evaluative 
mediation has anti-therapeutic outcomes.  
 
(i) Problem-Solving Models of Mediation 
 
In the early days of the present wave of mediation practice, there was little distinction 
between the models of mediation that were being practiced.  This was the case even 
though there were significant differences in approaches taken by mediators.  Riskin,81 in 
                                                 
74 NADRAC indicates that these two descriptions are not intended to be prescriptive; see ibid . 
75 See the Federal Court of Australia website and the button dealing with information regarding mediation at the Federal Court 
 (accessed at 24th April 2006). http://www.fedcourt.gov.au/litigants/mediation/mediation.html
76 These are the settlement, facilitative transformative and evaluative models.  He also refers to the narrative model by does not include this 
models as one of the four major paradigms of mediation see Boulle, n 7 at 43-47.  In this paper we discuss all of the models identified by Boulle, 
save the settlement model, which we regard as close to the evaluative model. 
77 Ibid at 43. 
78 Mediators have been criticised for their  “how to” approach to mediation , avoiding  theory in favor of a focus upon skills that lead to settlement,  
see Della Noce et al, n 22 at 45. 
79 Mills values diversity in the practice of mediation, although it may be that each model may require a different ethical code see K A Mills, “‘Can a 
Single Ethical Code Respond to All Models of Mediation?”(2005) 21 Bond Dispute Resolution News, 5 
 (accessed at 22 February 2006). http://www.bond.edu.au/law/centres/drc/newsletter/Vol21Dec05.pdf
80 Bush and Folger, n 6 at 239-247. 
81 There have been a number of publications discussing the Riskin grid, see for example Riskin L, “Understanding Mediators’ Orientations, 
Strategies, and Techniques: A Grid for the Perplexed” (1996) 1 Harvard Negotiation Law Review 7 
  
  
an influential analysis of models, pointed to the use of two main models of mediation, the 
facilitative and evaluative models.  He posited that mediation could be explained as a 
grid showing movement between an approach where the mediator sought to gain 
agreement through delving behind party’s positions and discovering needs and interests, 
to an approach where the mediator advised party’s of likely court outcomes and 
evaluated their dispute.  Riskin aimed to provide a grid to assist parties and their 
lawyers, to understand and make choices about mediation models.82  The articulation of 
the grid led to debate in the mediation industry concerning whether the evaluative 
model, or at least one part of the grid, could even be categorized as mediation and the 
negative repercussions of promotion of this type of practice.83  More recently, Riskin has 
responded to a range of criticism regarding this model and renamed the approaches 
“elicitive” and “directive”.  As indicated, these kinds of models could be described as 
problem-solving models as the aim of the process is primarily to bring about a solution 
to the problem that brings the parties to the mediation.84 Evaluative mediation has 
grown significantly in court-connected mediation in Australia and the United States,85 
particularly due to the apparent preference of lawyers for this approach.  Boulle, when 
considering the extent of mediator interventions in disputes notes that: 
 
…in commercial, court connected, personal injury and tribunal-based mediations, 
mediators tend to be “highly interventionist” in terms of informing, advising 
expressing opinions and making recommendations to the parties, highlighting their 
potential difficulties on the facts and law, and predicting what might eventuate if 
the matter proceeded to a court or tribunal.  In these settings mediators tend to be 
experienced lawyers, ex-judges, court registrars or other experts and the parties 
are often legally advised.86
 
Importantly, mediators may move through a range of models when mediating.  That is 
they may begin with an elicitive, facilitative approach and later introduce an evaluation 
of the merits of parties respective cases, becoming directive.87  Even in the 
transformative approach, where authors Bush and Folger emphasis that models should 
not be combined,88 mediators do sometimes move between models.89   
 
Where mediators take up that part of Riskin’s grid where they evaluate disputes and 
fail to consider parties emotional and relationship needs we argue that this model is 
anti-therapeutic.  This is because the positive psychological effects of dealing with 
                                                 
82 Riskin L, “Decisionmaking in Mediation: The New Old Grid and the New New Grid System” (2003-2004) 79 Notre Dame Law Review 1 at 4. 
83 Love L P, “The Top Ten Reasons Why Mediators Should Not Evaluate”  (1997) Florida State University Law Review 937. 
84 Some writings regarding therapeutic jurisprudence include the facilitative model, see for example Wexler, n 62 100. The adoption of the 
therapeutic jurisprudence framework may allow facilitative mediation to develop an approach to practice that does not rely upon neutrality and 
focuses more attention upon emotion rather than settlement, however we do not discuss this issue in detail in this paper. 
85 Welsh n 14. 
86 Boulle, n 7 at 40. 
87 Ibid at 43. 
88 Bush and Folger n 6 at  45. 
89 See Martin M, “How Transformative Is Volunteer Mediation? A Qualitative Study of the Claims of Volunteer Mediators in a Community Justice 
Program'” (2000) 18 Mediation Quarterly 33.  In this article the author describes research which demonstrates that mediators with the best 
intentions to practice transformative mediation would move, on occasion, from the transformative approach to a problem solving approach.  The 
more experienced the mediator the more likely the mediator was to adhere to the goal of transformative mediation. 
  
  
emotions and relationships are curtailed in evaluative mediation.  There is a focus upon 
outcomes and the “soft” issues of emotions and relationship are not addressed or are 
given marginal attention.  Jones and Bodtker90 have identified the lack of reflection by 
many mediators of the place of emotion in conflict.  They have pointed to the need for 
all mediators, whatever model of mediation is practiced, to address emotion as they 
argue that “emotion is the foundation for all conflict”.91  If mediators do not reflect upon 
the impact of emotion there can be negative effects for disputants and for the mediator 
(as the mediator’s emotional responses affect his/her practice).92  The evaluative model 
potentially will be anti-therapeutic as this approach focuses on solutions to problems and 
may merely provide simplistic venting of emotional concerns.93
 
The rise of the evaluative approach is at odds too with one of the core ideas of 
mediation, self-determination.  Parties are said to determine their own outcomes when 
undergoing  mediation as there is no third party empowered to decide the dispute.  
Welsh argues that as the evaluative model has become more popular in court-connected 
mediation the ideal of self-determination has diminished:   
 
However, as mediation has been institutionalized in the courts and as evaluation has 
become an acknowledged and accepted part of the mediator’s function the original 
vision of self-determination is giving way to a vision in which the disputing parties 
play a less central role.94
 
 
Significantly, the evaluative model tends to place less emphasis upon the parties 
articulating their concerns and more of a focus upon the rights of disputants.  The 
mediator provides an evaluation of the parties’ rights and may, in some instances, 
pressure the parties to settle the dispute. However, during the process the mediator will 
maintain the myth of neutrality, protesting that he/she has no decision-making capability.  
In a mediation this may mean that after a short hearing of opening statements, 
sometimes delivered by the legal representatives, the participants may be ushered into 
different rooms and the mediator will deliver offers by moving back and forth between 
the rooms. 95  This approach to mediation arguably affects the psychological outcome 
for the parties as parties lose true self-determination.96  
 
In this context the psychology of procedural justice is an important issue to consider. 
Research has shown that litigants highly value a sense of being involved in a fair 
process.  Being able to tell the story of the conflict and being treated with respect was 
more important than winning in court. 97  Tyler’s recent research led him to state: 
                                                 
90 Jones T and Bodtker A, “Mediating with Heart in Mind: Addressing Emotion in Mediation Practice,” (2001) 17 Negotiation Journal 217. 
91 Ibid at 219. 
92 Ibid at 239. 
93 Retzinger, S and Scheff, T “Emotion, Alienation and Narratives: Resolving Intractable Conflict” (2000) 18 Mediation Quarterly 71. 
94 Welsh, n 14 at 4. 
95 Welsh N, “Making Deals in Court-Connected mediation: What’s Justice Got To Do With It?” (2001) 79 Washington University Law Quarterly 787. 
96 Hensler, D “Suppose It’s Not True: Challenging Mediation Ideology” (2002) Journal of Dispute Resolution 81.  
97 Winick and Wexler describe this concept as follows: “The literature on the psychology of procedural justice, based on empirical work in a variety 
of litigation and arbitration contexts, shows that if people are treated with dignity and respect at hearings, given a sense of “voice,” the ability to tell 
  
  
 
People’s evaluations of the fairness of judicial hearings are affected by the 
opportunities which those procedures provide for people to participate, by the 
degree to which people judge that they are treated with dignity and respect, and by 
judgments about the trustworthiness of authorities.  Each of these three factors has 
more influence on judgments of procedural justice than do either evaluations of 
neutrality or evaluations of the favorableness of the outcome of the hearing.98
 
Procedural justice has long been recognized as an attribute of mediation, 99 but 
differing models provide differing experiences of procedural justice. We argue that the 
narrative and transformative models better meet parties’ need for procedural justice.  
They do so through the professional practice of the mediator allowing parties the 
opportunity to be heard by the authority figure of the mediator.  These new models 
value the stories brought to the process by the parties and listen without rushing to 
settlement.  Tyler identifies the wish by parties to experience procedural justice as more 
important than the issue of neutrality.  Some may argue that parties still need to feel the 
process of mediation is fair and by abandoning the rhetoric of neutrality there is a risk 
that parties may feel the process is lacking.  However, we maintain that if the mediator 
conducts the process in an even handed way, giving equal time and attention to the 
parties,100 the experience of fairness will be assured without relying on the attribute of 
neutrality.   
 
We will now discuss narrative and transformative mediation in more detail and show 
how they better deal with emotion and relationships and issues of procedural justice. 
 
(ii) Narrative Mediation 
 
Narrative mediation is a relatively new model of mediation that has its origins in 
narrative therapy101 and is predicated on a storytelling102 approach to conflict.  Based 
upon post-modern and social constructivist perspectives conflict is not constructed as the 
product of colliding individual needs, as postulated in problem solving models, but as 
“…the inevitable product of the operation of power in the modern world”.103  The 
mediator is not seen as the neutral facilitator of the process of the mediation, or as an 
evaluator of the merits of a dispute, but as a co-author in the re-storying of the conflict 
that brought the parties to the mediation table.  The authors of this model reject the 
                                                                                                                                               
their story, and “validation,” the feeling that what they have said has been taken seriously by the judge or hearing officer, they will experience 
greater satisfaction and comply more willingly with the ultimate outcome of the proceedings, even if adverse to them”,  see Winick and Wexler, n 10  
at 129. 
98 Tyler T, “The Psychological Consequences of Judicial Procedures: Implications for Civil Commitment Hearing,” in Wexler D and Winick B, Law in 
a Therapeutic Key: Developments in Therapeutic Jurisprudence as cited in Daicoff above n 53, 18. 
99 Note that Boulle identifies procedural justice as an attribute of facilitative mediation, see Boulle, n 7 at 44. 
100 For example,  in the narrative model the mediator is careful not to be seen as excessively warm towards one party and will not make off putting 
remarks to any party, see Winslade and Monk, n 5 at 137–40. 
101 Hansen T “The Narrative Approach to Mediation,” (2003) 4 Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal 297. 
102 This model has much in common with Cobb’s mediation as storytelling approach see Cobb S, “Empowerment and Mediation: A Narrative 
Perspective”(1993) 9 Negotiation Journal 245 .  New models of mediation practice may be described as “second generation practice”, see Cobb, n 
17. The storytelling model has not been considered in this paper, but we include it in our more general paper Douglas and Field, n 9. 
103 Winslade and Monk, n 5 at 41. 
  
  
liberal ideology that supports notions of neutrality observing when considering dominant 
models of practice that: 
 
The ultimate model for the mediator is that of the scientist-practitioner, the detached 
neutral observer applying the knowledge generated within modernist scientific 
tradition, in which the concept of problems solving is well entrenched.104
 
Instead, this approach looks beyond the facts and interests that are the subject of 
problem-solving mediations and deconstructs “the cultural and historical processes by 
which these facts and interests came to be.”105  The mediator is given the authority106 to 
be a co-author of the re-storying of the conflict from his role in the mediation process 
and he utilizes a number of innovative interventions to achieve the aim of arriving at a 
new, more harmonious view of the conflict.  Through techniques such as mapping the 
history of the dispute, curious questioning and externalising the problem, mediators seek 
to shake loose stories of mutual blame.  The written word is used to assist in the 
development of a new story, which may address the concern/s that brought the parties 
to the process.107
 
 
(iii) Transformative Mediation. 
 
The transformative model of mediation offers an alternative to litigation and the 
mirroring of the litigious process by problem-solving models, such as evaluative 
mediation. 108  The mediator in the transformative model is not considered a neutral third 
party, but instead acknowledges the impact of mediator interventions upon the 
mediation story with the normative aim of achieving moral growth.109   Unlike litigation 
mediation provides the opportunity to achieve unique outcomes, such as the transforming 
of the parties conflict.  The aim is to achieve the twin objectives of empowerment and 
recognition contributing to moral growth.  Parties can achieve empowerment through 
deciding for themselves how to address the conflict they are experiencing.   Mediator 
interventions encourage parties to see the conflict from the other party’s point of view, 
achieving a degree of empathy, called recognition. Achieving moral growth is the 
priority in conflict transformation, but solutions to problems can be found in addition to 
this normative aim.  In this respect, achieving the transformation of conflict, mediation 
cannot be compared to any other dispute resolution option110 and its transformative 
dimensions can benefit the specific dispute being mediated as well as the community 
                                                 
104 Ibid at 34. 
105 Ibid at 38. 
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practice, see ibid at 121. 
107 Ibid at 37-47. 
108 Bush and Folger, n 6 at 37. 
109 See Della Noce et al, n 22 at 57. 
110 Bush and Folger, n 6 at 60. 
  
  
more generally as participants become more adept at dealing with conflict. 111 Thus the 
moral growth of participants affects the disputing parties and the wider community.112
 
Like narrative mediation this approach relies upon postmodern and social constructionist 
literature as part of its philosophical basis, but also draws upon the fields of 
communication, cognitive psychology and social psychology. 113 Drawing in particular 
from psychology Bush and Folger  analyse conflict as causing an individual a “kind of 
crisis”.  When parties experience the conflict that leads to mediation they will often feel 
a sense of disempowerment and displacement.  Importantly, conflict of this kind affects 
an individual’s sense of self and relationships with others.  Parties react with a sense of 
weakness; becoming self-absorbed and self-centred.  Bush and Folger describe this 
process as a negative spiral of conflict which the transformative model can reverse.  
Mediators intervene in the conflict with the normative aim of transforming the conflict 
through empowerment and recognition shifts.114
 
Clearly, both the narrative and transformative model articulate an approach to 
emotional issues and relationships that problem-solving models do not.  The opportunity 
to tell the story of the conflict in these two models, listened to in an evenhanded manner 
by the mediator, arguably provides superior opportunities to experience procedural 
justice than in the problem-solving models.  We therefore believe that these new models, 
with their rejection of neutrality, are the approach that courts and policy makers should 
increasingly adopt in court-connected mediation programs. 
 
Conclusion:  The Need For Research Based Upon a Therapeutic Jurisprudence 
Framework 
 
At present research shows mediation has generally high satisfaction rates from 
parties.115  However, satisfaction may be affected by the expectations that parties 
bring to the process.  Boulle argues that:  
 
Some of the views expressed by mediating parties, for example that mediation ‘met 
my expectation’ have limited value without knowledge of the respondents’ prior 
expectations and understandings and more specificity on which individual needs were 
met in the process.116
 
Research into mediation often does not break down the model used117 and as such 
provides limited information to courts and policy makers as to the competing benefits of 
various models.  It is only when we are able to test the effectiveness of models of 
mediation that we will be able to make informed choices regarding the appropriateness 
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of the use of a model in a particular setting.  Therefore, we require evaluations of 
models that are based upon indicators other than satisfaction rates.  In our view 
evaluations should include assessments of the improvements to participants’ emotional 
and psychological well-being after experiencing a particular model of mediation.  
 
In this paper we have attempted to provide an alternative to the use of neutrality as a 
“legitimizing” framework for the practice of mediation in court-connected matters.  We 
have canvassed new models of mediation that do not rely upon the rhetoric of mediation 
in the way that problem-solving models do.   There is a resonance between therapeutic 
jurisprudence and the practice of narrative and transformative mediation that can 
traced to the emphasis that these models place upon the emotional and relationship 
dimensions of conflict and the resultant arguably positive therapeutic outcomes for 
parties who experience these models.  Evaluative mediation, we have posited, has anti-
therapeutic outcomes due to the sidelining of emotional concerns and the lack of 
procedural justice associated with this approach.  In order to test our assertions we 
believe that these models need to be researched in the court-connected context.  In this 
way policy makers118 and courts can engage with the benefits of these kinds of models.  
The approach of the research however, needs to be grounded in the philosophy of 
therapeutic jurisprudence.  Any evaluation must include the normative outcomes valued 
by this movement. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
118 Evaluations of justice initiatives are now common place in Australia, see for example Department of Justice, Quality Assurance Framework 
(Courts and Programs Development Unit, March 2006).
  
